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As pointed out in the call-for-papers of this Research Topic, the ability to understand and make use
of figurative language seems to be altered in most, if not all, cognitive disorders. In this Opinion
paper, it is argued that putting the focus on the evolution of human cognition helps achieve a better
understanding of the problems that clinical populations experience with figurative language, and
particularly, of the nature of the involved neural devices and cognitive mechanisms. The ultimate
reason is the deep link that exists between evolution and (abnormal) development, in the spirit of
evo-devo theories.
Human cognition outscores in the ability to transcend the signature limits of core knowledge
systems (Spelke, 2003; Wynn and Coolidge, 2011). Among other things, this ability enables to
combine and unify conceptual units that belong to distinct domains. Most types of figurative
language boil down to this ability. Paradigmatically, in metonyms and metaphors we refer to
a target domain in terms of a source domain, because a real-word link (in metonymy) or a
conceptual relationship (in metaphor) exist between both domains. Evolutionarily, this ability for
cross-modular thinking seems to be a human innovation, that seemingly resulted from the brain
rewiring linked to the emergence of our globular skull and brain. Accordingly, this anatomical shift
reshaped the connections between several cortical and sub-cortical areas (particularly, the thalamus
and the cerebellum) in the hominin brain and habilitated a new neuronal workspace, with more
long-distant connections and more cognitive fluidity (see Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco, 2014 for
details).
Interestingly, many candidate genes for the globularization of the human skull/brain and
for our cognitive distinctiveness are also candidates for cognitive disorders entailing problems
with figurative language, particularly, autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and schizophrenia (SZ)
(see Murphy and Benítez-Burraco, 2016a, Table 2). The same happens with candidate genes for
the patterns of brain activity underlying our mode of cognition, which result from phasal and
cross-frequency coupling properties of neural oscillation that are species-specific (Murphy and
Benítez-Burraco, 2017, Table 1). Overall, this suggests that the same genes that are mutated or
altered in cognitive disorders entailing problems with figurative language were involved in the
emergence of our mode of cognition. On the one hand, these cognitive disorders are thought to be
human-specific conditions. On the other hand, the gene loci associated with them are enriched in
genomic regions that have undergone positive selection in our species only, as the case of SZ nicely
illustrates (Srinivasan et al., 2017). The human-specificity of these cognitive disorders and their
high prevalence within modern populations is ultimately explained by the fact that the changes
that brought about our mode of cognition pushed the primate cognition far away from the robust
equilibrium achieved after millions of stabilizing selection and uncovered (or more properly, de-
canalized) the cryptic variation existing in primates (see Gibson, 2009 for a characterization of
complex disorders in humans as de-canalized conditions).
Nonetheless, this is not the full story. Most of the cognitive disorders entailing problems
with figurative language also entail problems with core components of language, like phonology,
semantics, or syntax, which, allegedly, concern to the literal meaning of utterances only.
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Again, ASD and SZ are paradigmatic examples (see Benítez-
Burraco and Murphy, 2016; Murphy and Benítez-Burraco,
2016b for review). To a certain extent, this is not surprising,
because as highlighted by cognitive linguistics, the boundaries
between figurative and non-figurative language are fuzzy
particularly, because core mechanisms involved in the former
(like metaphorization) also account for nuclear aspects of the
later (for instance, when we say Next week we will meet George
to convey the thought that we are going to meet George in 7
days, this is not regarded as a figurative use of language, in
spite that next week conceals the metaphor TIME is SPACE).
Nonetheless, the ultimate reason could be that our ability to
form cross-modular concepts (and thus, to metaphorize) can be
conflated to merge, the core combinatorial operation in natural
language, which combines elementary linguistic units to form
more complex units (see Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco, 2014, for
discussion). This ability is at the core of grammar, and ultimately,
of our ability to learn and use languages (that is, our language-
readiness).
Let us add a last chapter to this story. As noted by several
evolutionary linguists, the human-specific ability for cross-
modular thinking may have favored subsequent steps in the
evolution of language, specifically, the increase of language
complexity via grammaticalization (a process by which linguistic
items start to convey grammatical meanings or reinforce
their grammatical roles) and ultimately, the emergence of
modern languages (see Benítez-Burraco, 2017, for discussion).
Similarly to the use of figurative language, many aspects
of grammaticalization boil down to the principles governing
conversational exchange, particularly to pragmatic inferencing
(Smith and Höfler, 2014). Importantly, the acquisition of
pragmatic abilities has both a cognitive dimension (i.e., acquiring
the capacity for cross-modular thinking, surely, but also the
ability to understand others’ intentions) and a social dimension
(i.e., learning about social relations for mastering politeness
or learning to do things with words for correctly performing
speech acts) (Zufferey, 2015). Notice that people suffering from
cognitive disorders entailing problems with figurative language
(and as noted, deficits in core aspects of language) also experience
problems with social interactions. ASD is a classic example.
Although the problems that people with ASD have with figurative
language have been explained in terms of either a cognitive
deficit affecting the Theory of Mind (Happé, 1995), or a language
deficit per se, particularly, in semantic competence (Norbury,
2004), we cannot ignore that mastering both abilities needs a
rich social environment (see Syal and Finlay, 2011; Burnside
et al., 2017, and references therein). Following our line of
evidence, our hypothesis is that these disparate deficits (problems
with figurative language, with non-figurative language, and
with socialization) result from the impairment of a common
underlying biological mechanism that was remodeled during our
recent evolutionary history.
Ongoing research on language evolution also suggests that
modern languages, endowed with the full impedimenta which
is familiar to linguists, only emerged when human beings, being
cognitively modern, succeeded as well in constructing the socio-
cultural niche that, among many other things, allowed language
complexity to increase through a cultural process. In brief, this
niche provides the child with an extended socialization window
that enables him to interact with other people more safely, more
regularly, and for a longer time. Specifically, several researchers
have argued that this special niche resulted in part from the self-
domestication of the human species (see Hare and Tomasello,
2005; Thomas, 2014 among others, for details).
Intriguingly, most cognitive disorders in which the use of
figurative language is impaired (and which show problems with
structural components of language and altered socialization
patterns) exhibit an abnormal presentation of “domesticated”
traits in humans, from brain structure to behavioral features (see
Benítez-Burraco et al., 2016a on ASD and Benítez-Burraco et al.,
2017 on SZ). Self-domestication of our species has been explained
in terms of an adaptation to the human-made environment, or as
the result of selection against aggression (see Thomas, 2014, for
details). However, we have recently found that many candidate
genes for the domestication of mammals are also candidates (or
interact with candidates) for the globularization of the human
skull/brain (see Benítez-Burraco et al., 2016b for details). This
FIGURE 1 | Outline of an Evo-Devo approach to problems with figurative
language in populations with cognitive disorders. (A) Outline of the
evolutionary processes responsible for the emergence of our
language-readiness and of complex languages. (B) Outline of the three
aspects contributing to the problems with figurative language experienced by
people suffering from cognitive disorders.
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suggests that human self-domestication might be, to some extent,
a by-product of the same changes that brought about our species-
specificmode of cognition, encompassing both complex language
and the ability to process figurative language (Figure 1A).
It is not then surprising that these three facets of the human
phenotype (i.e., non-figurative language, figurative language, and
social behavior) are found altered in most, if not all, cognitive
disorders. Because the evolution of the three of them is tightly
interwoven, mutations in any of the candidate genes for the
process will result in problems in the three domains (Figure 1B).
Importantly, as noted by Wilkins et al. (2014), many of the
genes related to the domestication of mammals are involved
in the development and function of the neural crest. Although
this possibility has to be experimentally tested, we expect this
finding to provide with a single biological explanation of the
co-occurrence of linguistic, cognitive, and behavioral deficits in
disorders entailing problems with figurative language.
In sum, we anticipate that the study of the evolutionary
trajectory of human language illuminates the problems that
people with cognitive disorders usually experience with figurative
language. Specifically, we expect that this line of research helps
accommodate many of the hypotheses, sometimes disparate,
that have been formulated to account for such problems. As
with other aspects of language processing, development, and
evolution, we advocate for an approach to this issue that heavily
focuses on the oscillatory signature of the brain. For instance,
language deficits in ASD can be successfully tracked to an
abnormal oscillatory behavior of the autistic brain (Benítez-
Burraco and Murphy, 2016), that can be related, in turn, to
the inferred changes in the oscillatory dynamics of the hominin
brain during recent human evolution (Murphy and Benítez-
Burraco, 2017). Ultimately, we support an evo-devo approach
to this problem, aimed to disentangle how the specific patterns
of cortical inhibition and long-distance connections across the
brain that underlie our species-specific ability to form and exploit
cross-modular concepts develop in the child, evolved in the
species, and are impaired in people with cognitive disorders.
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